Future Warfare - The Rise Of Hybrid Warfare And Hybrid Wars.

THE HYBRID WARFARE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS.

The notion of hybrid warfare is most typically linked with US military strategist Frank Hoffman in Western literature. 

Hoffman began working on bridging the gap between the linear description of (regular or irregular) combat in the context of the twenty-first-century operational environment in the mid-2000s. 

'The blurring of modalities of combat, the blurring of who fights, and what technology are brought to bear, provides a vast spectrum of variation and complexity that we term Hybrid Warfare,' Hoffman said, drawing on the Israeli Defense Forces' (IDF) experience with Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006. 

1. Hybrid warfare, according to Hoffman, may be carried out by both states and non-state actors and entails "a variety of distinct modalities of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorism, including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder." 

2. Hoffman was not the first to detect these changes; as he has noted, prior hypotheses and observations strongly informed his own. 

Indeed, a deeper look at the literature preceding Hoffman's notion of hybrid warfare reveals that the word 'hybrid' had previously been used to characterize the hazy border between regular and irregular troops and capabilities. 

3. Nonetheless, Hoffman's work is notable because it sparked a discussion in the West about modern hybrid threats, with the notion of hybrid warfare being seen as a new way to think about twenty-first-century wars. 

The following sections examine hybrid warfare as it was first thought of and understood in the West. 

1. Unrestricted Warfare Theory And Meaning.
2. Fourth-Generation Warfare Theory And Meaning.
3. The Concept Of Compound Warfare.

Because the notion is a product of US military philosophy, it's vital to look at the environment in which it was created, as well as how it's been used by US academics and military personnel. 

As a result, this paper provides four major influences on the notion of hybrid warfare: unconstrained warfare, fourth generation warfare (4GW), compound warfare, and the objectives articulated in the 2005 US National Defense Strategy. 

~ Jai Krishna Ponnappan

You may also want to read and learn more about Global Geo Politics, Conflicts, And Conflict Resolution here.

Sources, References & Further Reading:

1. Lasconjarias, Guillaume and Jeffrey Larsen (eds), NATO’s Response to Hybrid Threats, Rome: NATO Defence College, 2015.

2. Tsygankov, Pavel (ed.), ‘Gibridnyye Voyny’ v khaotiziruyushchemsya mire XXI veka [‘Hybrid wars’ in the chaotic world of the twenty-first century], Moscow: Moscow University Press, 2015.

3. ‘Inside the KGB: An Interview with Retired KGB Maj. Gen. Oleg Kalugin’, CNN, https://web.archive.org/web/20070206020316/ 

http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/21/interviews/kalugin/ 

4. For example: Andrew, Christopher and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West, London: Penguin Books, 2000; Lunev, Stanislav, Through the Eyes of the Enemy: The Autobiography of Stanislav Lunev, Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 1998; Earley, Pete, Comrade J: The Untold Secrets of Russia’s Master Spy in America After the End of the Cold War, London: Penguin Books, 2007.

5. Von Clausewitz, Carl, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 13.

Hybrid Warfare & Conflict - Engineering Geo-Political Power, And Spheres Of Influence.

 

The lack of centralized decision-making in Europe has been shown in a harsh light. 

Putin, like Machiavelli, may believe that it is preferable to be feared than than liked. Putin can undoubtedly brag about his rise in power. 

• He has put Americans and Europeans on the defensive, sparked a flurry of high-level talks, and even gotten a written response to his ideas from the US and NATO (proposals which he must have known to be totally unrealistic if not impossible). 

• Nobody doubts, if anybody ever did, that Russia is still a major force. That much has been shown by its current set of actions in Ukraine. 

• Respect for Russia, which seems to be a strategic goal in and of itself, is another matter. It's simple to instill fear, but respect must be earned. 

Differences in ideas between EU Member States create a hole in the absence of EU integration in diplomacy and defense, rather than forging a nuanced but forceful unified perspective. 

• However, a history of internecine fighting should have taught Europeans one thing: exaggerating the significance of status does not alter the circumstances on the ground. As a result, there's no reason to bemoan his triumph. 

The United States must fill that power vaccum, with which everyone rallies in the face of Russian sabre-rattling. 

We have to be concerned about the demise of the European security architecture as we know it.

IS EUROPE IN DANGER?

One may threaten Ukraine with a hundred thousand soldiers, but one cannot conquer a Unified Europe. 

On a GDP the size of Belgium and the Netherlands combined ($1.483 trillion against $1.434 trillion in 2020), one does not begin a great power war against the EU and the US. 

• Putin may be able to put the future of Europe's security architecture on the table, but he does not have the authority to reverse it. 

• That can only be done by European leaders who are foolish enough to pull their own nation out of the EU or cynical enough to destroy democracy and the rule of law. 

• They endanger Europe by fracturing the Union and playing straight into the hands of other forces (sometimes even voluntarily). 

Natural resource dependency has both positive and negative consequences. 

Both Moscow and Brussels may threaten each other with economic penalties as a deterrent. 

• However, sanctions can only be employed once, after which nothing will happen save that both parties would suffer economic consequences, since neither party is likely to submit to penalties and modify its policy. 

• Economic penalties may signify displeasure and serve as punishment if that is the goal, but they will not alter the reality on the ground, just as a gain of face will not change the circumstances on the ground. 

Russia will have to negotiate if it wants to create an acceptable and sustainable change to the security arrangements on the European continent. 

• Negotiations take longer than Russian forces can stay focused on their current action in Ukraine without losing their advantage. 

• Further unilateral escalation by Putin's Russia will result in a prolonged destabilization of global security and peace that must be dealt with to avert a potential Humanitarian disaster.

• And, in order to have a chance of meaningful progress, both parties must be ready to make compromises, failing which a military resolution will result in a test of Russia's present invasive  posturing and actions in Europe.

If Putin was sincere and capable of honoring his public statements, Europeans and Americans would have had to negotiate, as they have said they are prepared to. 

Because restoring the weapons control and confidence-building framework that has lapsed in recent years would be very beneficial overall to Europe's security. 

Given Ukraine borders with EU/NATO member states, Any negotiations on the European Security Architecture must, without a doubt, involve all Europeans. 

Present Russian military mobilization, offenses,  and actions against Ukraine, its invasive occupation, and entry into eastern regions is thus tantamount to an act of war against Europe.

Only the supranational EU can be Europe's political center of gravity. 

• Back in 2014, the EU made the strategic choice to give Ukraine a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), to which Russia retaliated by invading the country. 

• All of the rest, such as NATO deterrence, Normandy negotiations, and EU sanctions, stemmed from the initial decision taken by Europeans via the EU. 

• Rather than introducing multiple forms, the EU must insist on a core trilateral arrangement if any peace is plausible, with the US and Russia, as a prerequisite for substantive discussions to begin. 

• Refusing to do so would be siding with Putin, who has made a habit of minimizing the EU in order to undermine European unity. 

However, it is improbable that sufficient mutual confidence can be developed to reach an agreement on the wider concerns given the unilateral violation of Ukraine's territorial integrity and its political borders. 

Russia continues to engage in near-constant hybrid measures against Europe and the United States. 

WHAT HAPPENS WHEN YOU INVADE AND LOOSE? 

IS THAT AN ACCEPTABLE OUTCOME, OR CAN FACE-SAVING MEASURES BE CO-DOCTORED FOR THE HIGHER OBJECTIVE OF GLOBAL STABILITY AND PEACE AS UKRAINE PAYS THE PRICE YET AGAIN.

Can Putin back out now that the least of the risk events has occurred, and the stakes have been increased dangerously high, with no sustainable success in Ukraine to enhance his power other than a minor pro-Russian separatist victory? 

All of  Ukraine, in its entirety, in its resilience, in truth, is a continuing defeat for Putin. 

• He drove a divided nation into Western orbit by invading in 2014. 

• He conquered Crimea but failed to achieve Russia's second goal of forming a sphere of influence throughout the former Soviet Union, despite its great power status (minus the Baltic states). 

• He will not be able to reclaim Ukraine without launching a full-scale assault. 

• But it seems to be the least probable scenario: the Ukrainian armed forces will fight with a Western backbone this time, and Putin will not want to lose some of his finest men in a stalemate. 

It is thus very important for the EU and the US to ensure that Ukraine has the necessary weapons, equipment, and ammunition to fight. 

• Furthermore, assuming that Russia does not want to blow Ukraine to the ground, it cannot wield its military superiority indefinitely. 

• An invasion would, in any case, result in military occupation, similar to the annexation of the Baltic nations in 1940. The desire to sovereignty reasserts itself when the occupation is gone, as history has shown. 

As a result, Russia's insistence that Ukraine not join NATO is damage control. 

• It also falls within a centuries-old policy of capturing land or establishing buffer zones along Russia's western frontiers to reduce the country's susceptibility to invasion in the absence of natural barriers. 

• If imposing neutrality on Ukraine is all it takes for Putin to finally acknowledge that it will not be part of any Russian sphere of influence, the West perhaps could have afforded to make the compromise prior to Russia's military actions. 

• The decision by NATO in 2008 to allow Ukraine and Georgia to join but without a deadline was a poor compromise between an aggressive Bush administration and hesitant Europeans, and the latter are still largely opposed. 

Neutrality may be seen as another face-saving move by Putin, but such 19th-century sensibilities should not guide European policymakers today. 

Furthermore, NATO expansion is not a goal in and of itself: new members should be welcomed only when our security requires it; nations that would bring more expenses than advantages and for which we are unwilling to go to war in any case should not be requested. 

Neutrality cannot be a unilateral compromise. Such an unrealistic expectation is a trigger and provocation for a larger widespread conflict that will be without bounds.

• Other than dispersing its forces, Russia has failed to make a genuine surrender, since they may be concentrated again on a whim. 

• Moscow has failed to stop supporting armed separatists in the Donbass and allow Ukraine's government in Kiev to reclaim control of the country's whole continental territory. 

• That is true, but it says nothing about the Crimea along with the Donbass, which is the price Ukraine is having to pay. 

That would not be fair, because, in the words of Bismarck, 

"we are not operating a judiciary, we are establishing policy." 

Putin, on the other hand, may be unwilling to make this compromise. 

Furthermore, if he is unable to reclaim Ukraine, he may decide that he does not want it to function. 

He will not want to see a well-functioning democratic Ukraine begin to exert any kind of appeal on his own populace, therefore this is a serious danger. 

(And neutrality would have no bearing on the DCFTA.) 

Russia may thus conclude that, despite its limited resources, it can get more out of a stable but (in its eyes) unsatisfactory deal by triggering another escalation when it sees fit, rather than a stable but (in its eyes) unsatisfactory deal, even if instability comes at the cost of additional sanctions. 

Sanctions along with Hybrid War Operations must be activated and  implemented, notwithstanding the fact that sanctions are unlikely to compel Russia to recede beyond its dictates and  unpredictable volatile leadership. 

• Putin may yet choose to restrict to a military effort, such as seizing the land bridge between Donbass and Crimea. 

• Russia would suffer fatalities, but it would establish a permanent Russian military presence in the Donbass as a fait accompli. 

• Another possibility is a repeat of the cyber-attack on 14 January. Both of these situations might result in extra severe retaliations. 

• The standoff would persist in all three scenarios, and perpetual instability would rule, leaving little hope for effective discussions on the larger security architecture. 

The Desperate and Blind Pursuit Of Obsolete Spheres Of Influence In an Increasingly Connected Globe. 

 

•  In mid-January 2022, when the West was focused on Ukraine, In Kazakhstan, Russia interfered immediately and effectively. 

• Some 2000 Russian forces, operating under the auspices of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and at the request of President Tokayev, assisted him in maintaining his grasp on power. 

• In November 2020, Russia dispatched 2000 soldiers as peacekeepers at the request of another CSTO member, Armenia, after brokering a cease-fire between its ally and Azerbaijan, ending another conflict over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh. 

• In November 2021, Russian involvement was required once again to stop fighting that had broken the cease-fire. 

• Georgia's predicament, on the other hand, is very comparable to that of Ukraine. 

• Russia secured the separatist areas of South Ossetia and Abkhazia during the 2008 Russo-Georgian conflict, eventually recognizing them as republics. 

• Approximately 10,000 Russian soldiers are now stationed there.  However, short of a full-scale invasion, the most Russia can hope for is a prolonged stalemate and the capacity to increase tensions anytime it wants. 

The conclusion is that Russia continues to operate as a security guarantee in former Soviet countries when the government and military forces, with or against the populace, embrace a largely Russian orientation. 

Belarus, for example, falls within this category. 

However, once a nation has shifted its orientation to the West, Russia may make things difficult for it, such as stopping it from joining the EU or NATO (though membership is not on the table anyway), but it cannot force it back into the fold. 

Meanwhile, China is competing with Russia, and in many cases has already surpassed it, as a trade and investment partner in practically all former Soviet countries. 

In 2013, Kazakhstan hosted the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative. 

There has formed a de facto division of labor that fits Beijing well, but one would wonder whether it really satisfies Moscow: when Russia acts as a security guarantor, it maintains the stability that enables it to no longer transform its military might into commensurate political and economic dominance. 

As a result, an exclusive Russian sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union is a pipe dream in reality. 

Russia doesn't have an option but to share power with China in a more or less Master-Junior Partner Bond. 

Outside of the former Soviet Union, Russia has established a military presence, either directly or via the Wagner Group's mercenaries, in the Central African Republic, Libya, and now Mali. 

The key success here, too, is continuing instability, which serves our goals. 

For Russia, the eastern and southern edge of Europe is one theater in where it may exercise its nuisance power at a cheap cost. 

Even in a nation like Mali, which is so reliant on European economic and military aid, Brussels should be considerably more concerned about its incapacity to prevent it from doing so. 

But, although Russia may strive to entrench itself, it lacks a genuine alternative project to offer these nations, other than ensuring the regime's or claimant's security, which it opportunistically supports. 

As internal politics change, such ties are prone to unravel. 

The exception is Syria, where Russian assistance insured the survival of a long-time partner, but that relationship, too, is unlikely to outlast regime transition if it ever occurs. 

Russia is also expected to fall farther behind the United States, China, and the European Union in terms of political clout and economic success. 

It will continue to be quite simple to use its annoyance capability. 

For the time being, Russia's military might has allowed it to punch above its political and economic weight. 

However, keeping its limited friends, much alone acquiring new ones, will grow more difficult as other nations make more appealing political and economic proposals. 

Will this encourage Moscow to consider a more cooperative grand strategy rather than a hostile one? Or will it continue to associate tremendous power with arrogance and aggression? 

For its part, the EU must remain laser-focused on its most important goals: defending its own way of life while preventing instability from spilling over from either its eastern or southern flanks. 

Stable neighboring nations that make their own sovereign decisions are a useful tool in achieving that critical goal. 

The EU's use of nuisance power can never be an aim in itself; although it must consider how to respond against Russian neighbors, good neighborly relations must remain the ultimate goal. 

Whatever course Putin and his successor choose, the EU must be open to conversation at all times, following the motto: cooperate when possible, but push back when necessary. 

However, this will need the development of a much stronger European reflex in all EU member states. 

If Europe's strategic center is a vacuum, neither collaboration nor pushback will occur, and the EU will be constantly unsettled by the next bold action from another state.

~ Jai Krishna Ponnappan

You may also want to read and learn more about Global Geo Politics, Conflicts, And Conflict Resolution here.

Sources & References:

• Arild, S., NATIONAL RESILIENCE AS A TOOL TO COUNTER HYBRID THREATS Sunde Arild. У збірнику представлено матеріали ІІ Міжнародної науково-практичної конференції «Управління та адміністрування в умовах протидії гібридним загрозам національній безпеці». Матеріали подано у авторській редакції. Редакційна колегія може не поділяти думок авторів. За достовірність даних та унікальність поданого до друку матеріалу, p.217.

• Coldea, F., 2022. Intelligence challenges in countering hybrid threats. National security and the future, 23(1), pp.49-66.

• Панфілов, О. and Савченко, О., 2022. THE SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECT IN THE CONTENT OF THE MODERN HYBRID WARFARE. " Вісник НЮУ імені Ярослава Мудрого". Серія: Філософія, філософія права, політологія, соціологія, 1(52).

• Solmaz, T., 2022. ‘Hybrid warfare’: A dramatic example of conceptual stretching. National security and the future, 23(1), pp.89-102.

• Bhattacharya, I., 2022. Hybrid Warfare Teasing Security Concerns in Asia. In The Palgrave Handbook of Global Social Problems (pp. 1-15). Cham: Springer International Publishing.

• Davies, L., 2022. A “hybrid offensive” in the Balkans? Russia and the EU-led Kosovo-Serb negotiations. European Security, 31(1), pp.1-20.

• Hook, K. and Marcantonio, R., 2022. Environmental dimensions of conflict and paralyzed responses: the ongoing case of Ukraine and future implications for urban warfare. Small Wars & Insurgencies, pp.1-29.

• Kurban, O. and Stadnichenko, O., 2022. Hybrid Conflicts in Modern Geopolitics: Based on Russian-Ukrainian Relations From 1991-2021. In Handbook of Research on Ethnic, Racial, and Religious Conflicts and Their Impact on State and Social Security (pp. 70-89). IGI Global.

• Eberle, J. and Daniel, J., 2022. Anxiety geopolitics: Hybrid warfare, civilisational geopolitics, and the Janus-faced politics of anxiety. Political Geography, 92, p.102502.

• Muradov, I., 2022. The Russian hybrid warfare: the cases of Ukraine and Georgia. Defence Studies, pp.1-24.

• Magnuson, S., Keay, M. and Metcalf, K., 2022. Countering Hybrid Warfare: Mapping Social Contracts to Reinforce Societal Resiliency in Estonia and Beyond (Spring 2022). Texas National Security Review.

• Gaiser, L., 2022. Chinese hybrid warfare approach and the logic of strategy. National security and the future, 23(1), pp.67-77.

• Andersson, M., 2022. Russia's use of Hybrid Warfare against the European Union 2014-2020: A qualitative content analysis.

• HOLECZ, J., THE ORIGINAL “HYBRID WARFARE”–PART I1. MILITARY NATIONAL SECURITY SERVICE, p.59.

• Kennedy, D., 2022. The Gun, the Ship, and the Pen: Warfare, Constitutions, and the Making of the Modern World by Linda Colley. Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 52(3), pp.430-431.

Hybrid Warfare - Understanding Influence Operation Threats, Information Warfare And Cyberwarfare.

The Threat of Influence Operations:  

The recent hacking of governmental websites, which has been largely blamed on Russia, has strengthened the generally held belief that Hybrid Warfare is synonymous with hostile cyber actions. 

• This ignores the far-reaching and deadly consequences of enemy influence operations in the economic and defense sectors. 

• These activities are more devious and harmful from a strategic standpoint. 

• Influence operations, unlike cyber operations, may last for a long time. 

While the EU is generally well-equipped to cope with hostile cyber operations, knowledge of and countermeasures against influence operations are unexpectedly lacking, both at the national and EU levels. 

Cyber operations are an important instrument in the spectrum of warfighting. 

They are a set of capabilities that are constantly assembled and deployed in varied configurations as policy goals change. 

However, cyber is only one instrument. A wide range of instruments are available in the toolbox. 

• When a specific tool combination is deployed, it may alter over time as the targeted aims are continually reassessed to ensure that assaults stay below the threshold of war, to the degree practicable. 

• When such judgments are made, there is a danger of miscalculation, which might lead to armed conflict if the threshold is reached. 

• Deliver maximum impact for militarily weaker states in order to compensate for this deficit by fundamentally weakening the speed, efficiency, and confidence with which political choices are made. 

• That involves political choices to activate a military response and deploy in response to hostile conduct by an enemy state, which need popular backing. 

Another goal of such influence efforts is to erode political support for defense expenditures. 

• Russia and China both have lesser military capabilities than NATO, and as a result, they have created a sophisticated Hybrid Toolbox with which the EU must deal effectively and quickly to safeguard its interests. 

• Because they are concrete, quantifiable, and fathomable, with immediate and sometimes apparent impacts, and in some circumstances with physical repercussions, cyber operations draw attention and catch the imagination of the public and state institutions. 

Hybrid warfare has existed since the birth of combat, but protagonists have lacked the tremendous force multiplier provided by cyber capabilities, which amplifies the effect of Hybrid operations. 

• This may be seen in the rapidity with which misinformation is spread, which weakens socio-political cohesiveness. 

• It may also result in the loss of control over critical operations and data (e.g. infrastructure, banking, health, etc.). 

Cyber is a comparatively easy realm to protect for political masters and corporations in democracies, since it is a well to which funds, experience, and techniques can be allocated. 

They may also show their constituents that this is considerably more difficult for politicians, the media, and state institutions to comprehend and respond to. 

A Combination Of Defense And Influence Activities

As a result, Hybrid Warfare encompasses a far larger variety of Influence activities. 

• These are designed to erode faith in activities. 

• The democratic system's cornerstone is trust, which allows it to make choices via its procedures and institutions. 

• As a result, such assaults may have strategic ramifications by weakening faith in the system and fostering division in society along the many fault lines of language, race, religion, economic position, and so on. 

One of the main goals of Attacker states is to create new perceptions that may compete with existing facts. 

This tactic employs a grain of truth as an anchor for a misinformation campaign in order to provide a completely false tale a veneer of legitimacy that can be transmitted quickly and widely via cyberspace. 

This is especially true in terms of defense: 

• As previously stated, one of the main goals is to erode public support for military actions and deployments. 

• For example, they've been used to falsely accuse troops of human rights violations in our armed vexatious cases. 

Deepfakes may also be used to portray NATO personnel on deployment in a misleading light. 

The result is two direct effects that are critical to the Attackers strategic objectives at a time when,

 

(1) Delay political decision-making on military response and deployment as public confidence in the armed forces erodes and politicians dither, giving the attackers time and space to consolidate (also politically) their gains on the ground. 

(2) Delay military acquisition and any modernization efforts as politicians respond to public opinion that has already been corrupted. 

A Combination Of Financial Warfare, Economic Targeting, And Influence Operations

Another significant sector that affects defense and security is economic and business activity, as well as technological innovation. 

• Patent (IP) management for dual-use technology should be a major defense issue. 

• Whoever understands the secrets of new game-changing technology first will have strategic advantages that are game-changing (e.g. Quantum Computing and Artificial Intelligence). 

This isn't only about the future, however. 

Obtaining majority shareholdings in EU businesses creating and managing cutting-edge dual-use satellite technology that may give the finest assistance available to hypersonic missiles is now a critical actual and conceivable danger to the economic, military, technical, and corporate combination. 

Such hybrid influence activities should be a top focus for the European Union. 

Influence operations may not even be primarily targeted at defense companies per se, making them much less visible as hostile actions. 

Political, military, security, intelligence, and corporate leaders must up their game by confronting the uncomfortable fact that influence operations may not even be primarily targeted at defense companies per se, making them much less visible as hostile actions. 

• Instead, they go after private sector firms that have nothing to do with the military in principle, such as sophisticated manufacturing, software development and service firms, digital platforms, and, most importantly, the space industry. 

In terms of opposing Influence Operations, the commercial space sector should become a crucial area that requires special attention. 

In terms of the space industry's hardware, the cost of launching spacecraft into space is decreasing, allowing nations to use commercial space operations for military purposes. 

Technologies that are of special interest to enemies, such as the development and deployment of hypersonic vehicles to transport military assets and deploy them swiftly, are a crucial area of military usage. 

The commercialization of data in space, in particular. 

Similar to the start of the nuclear weapons era in the mid-1940s, data and its management is the major new geopolitical and military battlefield. 

In terms of pure military operations, the digital backbone of the armed forces, which stretches from satellites to platoon commanders, guiding missiles and supporting both decision-making and operations, may well start to determine the military balance among the world's great powers in the four domains of land, sea, air, and information. 

As these private-sector-led technologies increase military capabilities, the race is on to see who can acquire a specific IP first. 

Despite seeming to be unrelated to the military, this is the primary area in which foreign influence operations must be fought. 

This is especially true given our military's reliance on the private sector for research, development, and procurement. 

China and Russia, on the other hand, depend on private-public partnerships and collaboration, with national goals (such as AI, 5G, and Quantum Computing) driving research and development. 

As a result, protecting our vital intellectual property in the private sector must become a top concern. 

Our private-sector enterprises are the legal owners of these strategic patents. 

The issue of who controls these corporations' shareholdings, boards, and management must become a major national security priority. 

This is because business owners and managers have complete control over who receives their new technology discoveries, whether they are friends or adversaries. 

For the media, the public, the political establishment, and state institutions, hybrid operations against such corporations (to obtain their IPs) are hardly the stuff of spectacular tales. 

Furthermore, they are not necessarily takeover activities headed by EU-based and licensed firms with monies already in the EU's banking system, but whose ultimate beneficiaries may be Russian or Chinese, or anybody else. 

Until 2018, certain Baltic nations were mostly Russian-speaking. These monies are likely still moving in the EU, where they may be readily exploited to purchase enterprises that are strategically helpful to rivals. 

In other instances, opportunistic or purposeful exploitation and manipulation of Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) concerns in publicly traded corporations may be used to compel a change in ownership, board of directors, and management. 

Areas For Leveraging DeepFakes

DeepFakes may also be used in such influence operations to fraudulently portray politicians, business leaders, or auditors making remarks that indicate a significantly worse financial status of their company or the standards to which they comply, for example. 

The speed with which social media may disseminate these DeepFakes before the truth is re-established (if at all), might result in a stock market crash, a bank run (if it is falsely believed to be bankrupt), and eventually civil upheaval. 

It may cause the implementation of vital technologies and infrastructure that impact economic development and growth, such as 5G, nuclear energy and waste treatment, and vaccinations, to be delayed. 

Such sponsored enterprises may pose a direct security and defense danger to their proxy non-state actors. 

Belgium is especially vulnerable: it ranked ninth in the world in terms of patents per million people in 2018, just ahead of Japan. Many EEA countries were also in the top seven. 

Many businesses have had substantial cash flow challenges as a result of COVID, which provides chances for hostile influence operations to purchase stakes in small and medium-sized technological firms. 

In Hybrid warfare Influence Operations, defense, security, technology, and the economy are all intertwined, and quick response is critical. 

Not just in the Cyber realm, but also in the economic sphere, we must quickly establish resilience and the high-quality reaction necessary to cope with influence-induced crises. 

• Building resilience and crisis management capacities requires a public-private cooperation. 

• The creation of a trustworthy network within which information may be transmitted in a safe environment is a cornerstone of this collaboration. 

• The institutional foundation for such an attempt may be an Economic Security and Intelligence capacity that operates this collaboration and assembles a collection of disparate data and information into a cohesive picture of the danger presented by Influence Operations. 

• To make state institutions take economic influence operations seriously in the same way they take other (more visible) threats seriously, a bureaucratic and business culture shift is required.

• Meanwhile, business must acknowledge and comprehend that not all market activity is benign, and to trust the state with what they are facing. 

Citizens, businesses, and the government all have a similar interest in preserving our economy, security, and way of life, thus the moment for such a transition in culture and institutional frameworks is ideal. 

Influence Operations, much more than cyber per se, pose a serious and direct danger to all three. 

Our society will suffer catastrophic repercussions if business as usual continues. 

The only way to defeat hostile Influence Operations is to establish and implement a new mode of operation that depends on cooperation between state institutions and the private sector on the one hand, and between the state and the private sector on the other. 

The ministries of the economy, finance, and infrastructure must all have a role in national security. 

• Beyond cyber-attacks, the longer-term concern in Ukraine is precisely this subtle blend of strategic influence operations. 

• Similar dangers to the EU's economic, technological, and military combination must be assumed, and the EU must respond quickly and aggressively.

~ Jai Krishna Ponnappan

You may also want to read and learn more about Global Geo Politics, Conflicts, And Conflict Resolution here.

Sources & References:

• Eberle, J. and Daniel, J., 2022. Anxiety geopolitics: Hybrid warfare, civilisational geopolitics, and the Janus-faced politics of anxiety. Political Geography, 92, p.102502.

• Muradov, I., 2022. The Russian hybrid warfare: the cases of Ukraine and Georgia. Defence Studies, pp.1-24.

• Magnuson, S., Keay, M. and Metcalf, K., 2022. Countering Hybrid Warfare: Mapping Social Contracts to Reinforce Societal Resiliency in Estonia and Beyond (Spring 2022). Texas National Security Review.

• Панфілов, О. and Савченко, О., 2022. THE SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECT IN THE CONTENT OF THE MODERN HYBRID WARFARE. " Вісник НЮУ імені Ярослава Мудрого". Серія: Філософія, філософія права, політологія, соціологія, 1(52).

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Frequently Asked Questions

1. What is Hybrid Warfare?
• To put it another way, hybrid warfare is defined as the interaction or fusion of traditional and unconventional weapons of power and subversion. These instruments or methods are synergistically used to exploit an antagonist's weaknesses and create synergistic effects. Hybrid warfare is a military tactic initially advocated by Frank Hoffman that combines political warfare with conventional, irregular, and cyberwarfare, as well as other influencing measures including false news, diplomacy, lawfare, and foreign electoral interference. 
2. What is an example of the term "hybrid warfare"? 
• The 2006 confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah is one of the most often cited instances of a hybrid war. Hezbollah is a well-organized non-state force backed by Iran.  While it often works as a mouthpiece for Iran, the organization has its own goal. 
3. What does NATO mean when it says "hybrid warfare"? 
• Disinformation, cyber assaults, economic pressure, and the deployment of irregular armed groups, as well as the employment of regular troops, are all examples of hybrid threats. 
4. What is a GREY war? 
• Grey zone actions, in general, include pursuing political goals via carefully planned operations; moving gently toward goals rather than achieving definitive outcomes fast; working to stay below critical escalatory thresholds in order to avert conflict; and using all instruments of state power. 
5. Why is hybrid warfare a national security threat? 
•  Hybrid warfare employs all aspects of state power to force its will on another state, focusing on the weakest development areas and attaining outcomes. Indeed, this kind of warfare assumes that society becomes the first line of defense. 
6. What are the dangers that exist in the grey zone? 
• The end outcome Hybrid threats, sharp power, political warfare, malevolent influence, irregular warfare, and contemporary deterrence are all terms used to describe the gray zone phenomena. The International Security Program at CSIS has looked at these dangers and how the US might effectively discourage, campaign in, and react to gray zone tactics. 
7. What is cyberwarfare's primary goal? 
• The purpose of cyberwarfare, according to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, is to "weaken, disrupt, or destroy" another country. Cyberwarfare programs aim for a broad range of objectives that might hurt national interests in order to accomplish their aims. 
8. When did hybrid warfare first appear on the scene? 
• First, in 2005, two US military officers wrote on the "development of hybrid wars," emphasizing the use of both conventional and unconventional strategies, techniques, and tactics in modern combat, as well as psychological and information-related elements of current battles. 
9. What is non-kinetic warfare, and how does it differ from kinetic warfare? 
• Non-kinetic Warfare (NKW) is a complete operational concept that is employed in the interlaced, overlapping, and integrated Electromagnetic Spectrum, Information Space, and Cyber Space to allow non-kinetic environment supremacy, according to our definition. 
10. Is there a distinction between conventional and unconventional warfare? 
• Unconventional warfare is an effort to win victory indirectly via a proxy army, while conventional warfare is employed to directly diminish the opponent's military capabilities through assaults and maneuvers. 
11. What is subthreshold warfare, and how does it work? 
• Sub-threshold warfare, a sort of warfare in which open armed combat is avoided but confrontation is definitely occurring, is arguably a new character on the stage. The Salisbury assaults, Chinese activity along the 9 Dash Line, and western involvement in Iraq and Syria are all examples of this. 
12. What is the definition of a proxy army? 
• Non-state proxy armed forces are often defined as irregular military organizations that engage on behalf of a foreign authority in an internal armed conflict, either entirely or partly. Militias, rebels, and "terrorists" are among them. 
13. What does fifth-generation warfare imply? 
• Fifth-generation warfare (5GW) is characterized by non-kinetic military actions such as social engineering, deception, and cyberattacks, as well as emerging technology like as artificial intelligence and completely autonomous systems. 
14. Who came up with the phrase "hybrid warfare"? 
• Hybrid warfare is a military tactic initially advocated by Frank Hoffman that combines political warfare with conventional, irregular, and cyberwarfare, as well as other influencing measures including false news, diplomacy, lawfare, and foreign electoral interference. 
15. How can you put a halt to a hybrid war? 
• Training, drills, and education are all important parts in preparing to deal with hybrid threats. This entails putting decision–making procedures to the test as well as coordinating joint military and non-military responses with other stakeholders.