Cyber Warfare - ANONYMOUS GROUP.

 

Anonymous is the term given to a worldwide group of hackers, hacktivists, human rights activists, and online activists.

The organization as a whole is nebulous, making it difficult to pin down objectives, members, or activities.

• The organization professes to be without a leader, and members are typically unfamiliar with one another since the only thing that binds them is a mutual respect for anonymity.

• Anonymous is best known online for their logo, which features a suited man whose head has been replaced by a question mark surrounded by peace branches. It's said to be inspired by Rene Magritte's surrealist artwork.

• Individuals claiming to be members of Anonymous also often post movies in which they hide their voices and don Guy Fawkes masks, as shown in the film V for Vendetta.

Anonymous Tagline:

We are Anonymous.

We are Legion.

We do not forgive.

We do not forget.

Expect us.

What Are The Origins Of Anonymous? 

The group's origins may be traced back to the 4chan discussion board on the internet.

• Users may post on a variety of subjects without needing to establish an account on this bulletin board.

• Rather, they may use the user name "Anonymous" to post anonymously.

• The moniker Anonymous was derived from this forum.

Anonymous began in 2003 on the imageboard 4chan, embodying the idea of numerous online and offline community members operating as a "anarchic," digitized "global brain" or "hivemind" at the same time. 

The internet message boards of 4chan, are an anonymous social community website launched in 2003. 

• Even today, 4chan postings from people who don't identify an identity are classified as "Anonymous." 

• Users would regularly arrange collective pranks termed "raids" in the early days of the website, filling chat rooms in games and other online communities to create disturbances. 

After critics accused participants of cyberbullying and publishing inappropriate information, 4chan started clamping down on the raids. 

Anonymous' activities were founded on these raids: 

• a decentralized network of like-minded internet individuals who communicated in encrypted chat rooms to organize online disturbances. 

• Initially, the goals were primarily for inexpensive amusement. 

• They eventually became more focused on social or political goals. 

In 2008, 4chan members lead by early Anonymous hacker Gregg Housh initiated a concerted operation against the Organization of Scientology, utilizing methods such as denial-of-service (DDoS) assaults on the church's websites, hoax phone calls, and faxing the church black pages to waste their printer ink. 

The hacks, dubbed "Project Chanology" by Anonymous, were reprisal for what the hackers saw as censorship attempts: 

• After Gawker published a hacked video of star Tom Cruise enthusiastically promoting Scientology, the church threatened Gawker with legal action. 

• Following that, a wave of anti-Scientology demonstrations erupted throughout the globe, with many Anonymous supporters donning Guy Fawkes masks symbolizing the 17th century British insurrectionist. 

Those masks have subsequently become synonymous with a hacking collective. 

Anonymous Hacktivism's Main Targets, Mission, And Philosophy.

Anonymous generally criticizes governments and companies that it believes are involved in censorship or promote inequality. 

• Because there is no actual structure or leadership in the organization because it is decentralized, there is typically a lot of internal dispute over which ideas or causes to support. 

• Anonymous members are described as "working class folks seeking a better future for mankind" in a pinned 2019 tweet on the @YourAnonNews Twitter account - which, again, professes not to speak for the collective as a whole. 

• "Freedom of information, freedom of expression, accountability for businesses and governments, privacy and anonymity for individual persons" are listed as Anonymous' guiding values. 

Anonymous members have targeted a lengthy variety of parties since "Project Chanology," including the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) and the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), who attempted to block pirating websites from spreading copyrighted music and pictures. 

After federal authorities shut down file-sharing website Megaupload.com in 2012, the US Department of Justice and FBI investigated. 

PayPal has stopped accepting contributions for Wikileaks and its controversial founder, Julian Assange. 

As part of the 2011 Arab Spring pro-democracy rallies, official websites in Tunisia, Egypt, and other Middle Eastern and African nations were defaced. 

Following the terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015, ISIS took control of the city. 

Hundreds of hackers with apparent connections to Anonymous have been detained throughout the globe, including at least 14 persons convicted for breaching PayPal in 2011. 

Barrett Brown, a journalist and self-described Anonymous spokesman, was sentenced to more than four years in jail in 2012 after being arrested on counts of cybercrime and threatening a federal officer. 

After some of those arrests, Anonymous' operations faded, but it reappeared last year when it claimed credit for hacking the Republican Party of Texas in protest of the state's contentious abortion legislation. 

Anonymous also claimed responsibility for a September breach of web hosting business Epik, which resulted in the release of more than 150 terabytes of data on far-right organizations such as QAnon and the Proud Boys.

In 2003, the organization started organizing Internet trolling actions, the most well-known of which was an online raid on the chatting service and virtual teen hangout Habo Hotel.

The gang used the same identity, a black guy in a gray suit with an Afro, to penetrate the website.

They swamped the website before organizing themselves into different shapes, such as a swastika.

Initially formed to troll for the sake of amusement, or "lulz," the organization gradually started to coordinate activities against groups they thought were attempting to suppress freedom of expression.

In 2008, the Church of Scientology was the target of one of the first politically motivated organized assaults.

A leaked video of Tom Cruise speaking against Scientology was used by the church to try to silence him.

The "hive," as they were known at the time, organized a 4chan message board under the name "Project Chanology" to rally hackers against Scientology in the first large-scale concerted operation.

• Followers attempted to disrupt the Church of Scientology's Web site with a series of distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) assaults, prank phoned the Scientology hotline, and sent faxes that printed nothing but giant black blocks to waste ink.

• Following that, a video was uploaded in which an unknown speaker warned that they would expel and dismantle the Church of Scientology in a systematic manner.

• This was followed ten days later by a major demonstration in which Anons, or members of Anonymous, assembled in person to condemn Scientology in several locations.

The greatest protest took place in Los Angeles, when a thousand people marched outside the Church of Scientology facility, many wearing Guy Fawkes masks.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) began to take the threat posed by Anonymous seriously later that year.

Following the success of the Scientology protests, internal strife arose over whether the organization should continue to engage in politically motivated activities.

The group's popularity waned, but by late 2010, the Anons had resurfaced to launch Operation Payback against the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) and the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA).

• These groups aimed to take down file-sharing websites like The Pirate Bay.

• Amazon.com, PayPal, and Visa were among the targets of their assaults, which they said were attempting to silence Julian Assange or WikiLeaks.

• The FBI later arrested 14 hackers as a result of this assault.

• Anons also aided the Arab Spring protests by distributing software to shield Web browsers from government monitoring and staging DDoS attacks on official websites.

Anonymous, or its offshoot LulzSec, is also suspected of being responsible for attacks on HBGary Federal, the Ugandan government, the Westboro Baptist Church, and Sony.

• Anons have attacked many child pornography and revenge pornography sites in favor of the Occupy Wall Street movement.

• Currently, Anonymous, a hacking group, is claiming credit for a range of acts in both real life and cyberspace.

• The organization planned the Million Mask March and has since gotten active in Ferguson, Missouri demonstrations.

• Anonymous has also attacked Islamic extremist organizations and the Ku Klux Klan's websites.

• The organization has a YouTube account where people may keep up with its current activities.

Anonymous's Cyberwar On Russia. 

Cyber battles are often conducted in the shadows, but in the case of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Anonymous has issued the most public declaration of war. 

A hacking organization tied to Anonymous, @YourAnonOne, claimed that it was targeting Vladimir Putin's administration. 

In the days after, the organization has claimed responsibility for a number of cyber mishaps, including distributed denial of service assaults, which have shut down government websites as well as Russia Today, the state-run news agency. 

• On a Sunday afternoon, the DDoS assaults looked to be working, with the Kremlin and Ministry of Defense official websites remaining down. 

• Anonymous also claimed to have stolen the Ministry of Defense database, and on Sunday, the hackers claimed to have hacked Russian official television networks, broadcasting pro-Ukraine material like as patriotic songs and photographs from the assault. 

Because Anonymous is an informal collective, attribution of these assaults to Anonymous is challenging. 

• "It may be difficult to explicitly trace this action to Anonymous, since targeted businesses would likely be unwilling to reveal associated technical data," Jamie Collier, a consultant with US cybersecurity company Mandiant, said. 

• The Anonymous collective, on the other hand, has a track record of carrying out this kind of action, and it is very much within their capabilities." 

• The CIA, the Church of Scientology, and the Islamic State have all been targets in the past, and although the group was shaken by a series of arrests in the United States in the early 2010s, it reactivated following the death of George Floyd. 

Anonymous' guiding ideology has been defined as "anti-oppression" by one former member. 

• Russia Today explicitly blamed Anonymous for the website's issues, claiming that the assaults occurred after the organization released their "declaration of war." 

• "After Anonymous' declaration, RT's websites were the target of huge DDoS assaults from approximately 100 million devices, largely situated in the United States," a representative for the channel stated. 

• In contrast, despite popular expectations that a Russian military attack on Ukraine would be accompanied by digital shock and awe, cyber activity against Ukraine has been very quiet thus far. 

DDoS attacks were launched against Ukrainian websites ahead of the offensive, including the Ukrainian defense ministry and PrivatBank, Ukraine's largest commercial bank, but nothing compared to the NotPetya attack in 2017, when a devastating malware attack blamed on Russia destroyed computers in Ukraine and around the world. 

The first denial of service sorties were "quite minor," according to Cloudflare, a US tech company that defends businesses from DDoS assaults. 

On the 15th and 16th of February, the UK and US administrations accused Moscow for a series of DDoS assaults against Ukrainian websites. 

DDoS salvos, like Anonymous' assaults, are intended to generate confusion and destroy morale, while malware may inflict significant and irreversible damage. 

NotPetya, a so-called wiper virus that was placed into Ukrainian tax accounting software but spread to other nations, caused $10 billion (£7.5 billion) in harm globally by permanently encrypting machines. 

A wiper assault was launched in Ukraine, using a novel strain of malware known as HermeticWiper, which blocked machines from restarting. 

However, due to the attack's small size, only a few hundred computers were compromised, and the attack's geographic scope was restricted to Latvia and Lithuania. 

There have been cyber battles in other parts of the war. 

• The Russian government has put certain limits on Facebook after authorities accused the social media site of restricting state-backed media, causing Facebook to block adverts from Russian state media. 

• State-run media advertisements are likewise prohibited on Google's YouTube platform. 

• Elon Musk, another US tech billionaire, is supplying Ukraine with satellite internet access through his Starlink satellites, while the Ukrainian government is openly soliciting worldwide bitcoin contributions and has apparently received millions of dollars in return. 

Despite this, the cyber component of the Ukraine war has remained relatively low-key to thus time. 

Ciaran Martin, a former director of the UK's National Cyber Security Centre and professor of practice at Oxford University's Blavatnik School of Government, believes cyber has played "remarkably little role" in the fight so far. 

Russian cyber action against Ukraine has been there for some time, but it is consistent with Russia's long history of cyber harassment of the nation.

Similarly, as far as we can tell, the west's reaction to Russia has not included a big cyber component - instead, it has focused on imposing strict sanctions. 

All of this might change, and the west is correct to be vigilant in the face of growing cyber activity.

~ Jai Krishna Ponnappan

You may also want to read and learn more about Cyber Warfare, Global Geo Politics, Conflicts, And Conflict Resolution here.

Related Topics:

Assange, Julian; 4chan; Hacktivist; LulzSec

Further Reading:

Coleman, Gabriella. Hacker, Hoaxer, Whistleblower, Spy: The Many Faces of Anonymous. London: Verso, 2014.

Olson, Parmy. We Are Anonymous: Inside the Hacker World of LulzSec, Anonymous and the Global Cyber Insurgency. New York: Back Bay Books, 2012.

The National Defense Strategy Of 2005.

The most recent document that had a major impact on the development of the notion of hybrid warfare was Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's initial  National Defense Strategy (NDS). 

The National Protection Strategy lays forth a multi-pronged, multi-layered strategy to the nation's and its interests' defense. 

It aims to establish circumstances that promote nation-state sovereignty and a stable international order that promotes freedom, democracy, and economic opportunity. 

According to Hoffman, the  NDS presented a strategy for dealing with "unusual problems and strategic ambiguity" and "preparing the Department of Defense to tackle 21st-century issues."  

The National Defense Strategy (NDS) is divided into three sections: 

• 1. 'America's Security in the Twenty-First Century,' 

• 2. 'A Defense Strategy for the Twenty-First Century,' and 

• 3. 'Desired Capabilities and Attributes.' 

NDS 2005 outlines "an active, layered approach to the defense of the [US] nation and its interests."  

While it appears that the NDS's main purpose was to reexamine the US Department of Defense's (DoD) investment portfolio in light of the changing security environment since September , Hoffman's conceptualization also included an analysis of the four major groups of challenges that shape the security environment in the twenty-first century. 

1. The first category contains 'traditional challenges,' which are most typically associated with governments that utilize armies, navies, and air forces in long-established forms of military conflict.'  
2. The second includes 'irregular challenges,' which are posed by 'Adversaries,' who use 'irregular methods to erode US influence, patience, and political will... [and] take a long-term approach, attempting to impose prohibitive human, material, financial, and political costs on the US to compel strategic retreat from a key region or course of action.'  'Catastrophic challenges' are the third kind of difficulty. 
3. These problems arise as a result of "hostile forces" pursuing "catastrophic capabilities, notably weapons of mass destruction." 
4. The fourth category includes 'disruptive challenges,' which are offered by prospective adversaries aiming to create breakthrough technologies and accompanying military weapons with the ability to radically alter combat ideas. 

Such "disruptive" developments, according to the NDS, might come in biotechnology, cyber operations, space, directed-energy weapons, and other fields. 

On the one hand, these descriptions of difficulties provide relatively little new information, particularly since the notion of irregular challenges resembles the previously mentioned 4 GW concept. 

On the other hand, the NDS's key contribution is its proposal that these difficulties may overlap, since "actors skilled in one might be anticipated to strive to strengthen their position using techniques and skills from others." 

The NDS notes in its examination of this increasing capacity of combined challenges: 

• Recent experience shows that the most perilous scenarios come when we are confronted with a complex of difficulties. 

• In Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, our foes posed both classic and irregular threats. 

• Terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda pose sporadic risks, but they are also aggressively seeking catastrophic capabilities. 

• North Korea faces conventional, irregular, and catastrophic issues all at the same time. 

Furthermore, the NDS concludes that "in the future, the most competent adversaries may strive to combine really disruptive capabilities with conventional, irregular, or catastrophic means of warfare."  

Two major characteristics of the NDS should be highlighted. 

• 1. On the one hand, the NDS establishes a highly conventional framework of distinct developing issues, focused on the highest strategic level and developed with the particular objective of preserving and improving America's competitive advantages in light of the changing security environment. 

• 2. On the other hand, it recognizes that the lines between these issues are blurring, and that this fusion will create America's most competent opponents. In other words, the NDS implies that tomorrow's difficulties will not offer particularly distinct and independent dangers, but a deadly mixing of them, without diving into the nuances of this fusion, since that is not its aim.

FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS:

What is the summary of the National Defense Strategy? 

It discusses how the United States' Armed Forces will fight and win America's conflicts, as well as how we will cooperate with and through partner countries to create opportunities in the international environment in order to improve security and avoid conflict. 

What are the 3 Components of the National Defense Strategy? 

The National Defense Strategy is divided into three components: 

1. First, we must restore military preparedness as we construct a more deadly Joint Force; 
2. second, we must deepen alliances as we seek new partners; 
3. and third, we must change the Department's commercial operations to improve performance and cost effectiveness. 

Who came up with the National Defense Strategy? 

The Office of the Secretary of Defense came up with the NDS.

The United States Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) develops the National Defense Strategy (or NDS), which is signed by the Secretary of Defense as the Department of Defense's (DoD) capstone strategic direction. 

What year did the first National Defense Strategy come out? 

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-433), which tasks the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President, and the Secretary of Defense with providing strategic direction for the armed forces, created the National Military Strategy (NMS). 

What is the total number of national defense strategies? 

There have been four NDS reports, the first of which was released in 2005. 

The NDS was established by the Secretaries of Defense prior to FY2017 to expand on the principles outlined in the QDRs. 

What is the frequency of changes to the National Defense Strategy? 

The National Defense Strategy (NDS) establishes military goals for the United States and is updated every four years to coincide with the election of a new president. 

What is NATO's National Defense Strategy, and what does it entail? 

Individual liberty, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law are all fundamental elements of NATO's overarching strategy: averting conflict and war, defending Allies, retaining freedom of choice and action, and supporting the ideals and values it stands for. 

Is the National Military Strategy a classified document? 

The NMS is classified to allow the Chairman to fully assess the Joint Force operating environment and provide unfettered military advice in support of the 2018 National Defense Strategy. 

While an unclassified overview of the NMS is made available to the public, the strategy itself is classified to allow the Chairman to fully assess the Joint Force operating environment and provide unfettered military advice in support of the 2018 National Defense Strategy. 

What Is The National Defense Strategy's Main Goal? 

The National Defense Strategy (NDS) focuses on the role of the Department of Defense in carrying out the President's National Security Strategy (NSS). 

It was established by Congress in Section 941 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2017 (Public Law 114-328) to replace the Quadrennial Defense Review, in compliance with the National Security Act of 1947. 

There have been four NDS reports, the first of which was released in 2005. 

The NDS was established by the Secretaries of Defense prior to FY2017 to expand on the principles outlined in the QDRs. 

The Office of the Secretary of Defense prepares the NDS, which is issued every four years. 

The paper explains how the Department of Defense will contribute to the achievement of NSS goals in order to sustain global security and prosperity. 

The National Defense Strategy must address the global strategic environment, military posture, and the United States' role in international security.

~ Jai Krishna Ponnappan

You may also want to read and learn more about Global Geo Politics, Conflicts, And Conflict Resolution here.

Attached: Read the National Defense Strategy 2005

Read The Summary Of The Latest National Defense Strategy 2018

Sources, References & Further Reading:

• Hoffman, Frank, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Warfare, Arlington: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007, p. 14.
• For example: Nemeth, William, ‘Future War and Chechnya: A Case for Hybrid Warfare’, PhD diss., Monterey, Naval Postgraduate School, 2002; Morelock, Jerry, ‘Washington as Strategist: Compound Warfare in the American Revolution, 1775–1783’, in Huber, Thomas (ed.), Compound Warfare: That Fatal Knot, Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2002, p. 78.
• Qiao, Liang and Xiangsui Wang, Unrestricted Warfare: China’s Master Plan to Destroy America, Panama City: Pan American Publishing Company, 2002.
• Scobell, Andrew, ‘Introduction to Review Essays on “Unrestricted Warfare”’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 11, 1 (Spring 2000), pp. 112–13; Cheng, Dean, ‘Unrestricted Warfare: Review Essay II’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 11, 1 (Spring 2000), pp. 122–9.
• Thomas Moorer cited on the back cover of Qiao and Wang, Unrestricted Warfare.
• Bunker, Robert, ‘Unrestricted Warfare: Review Essay II’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 11, 1 (Spring 2000), pp. 114.
• Luman, Ronald (ed.), Unrestricted Warfare Symposium 2006: Proceedings on Strategy, Analysis, and Technology, Laurel, MD: Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, 2006; Luman, (ed.), Unrestricted Warfare Symposium 2008: Proceedings on Combating the Unrestricted Warfare Threat; Integrating Strategy, Analysis, and Technology, Laurel, MD: Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, 2008.
• Qiao and Wang, Unrestricted Warfare, p. 155.
• Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century, p. 22.
• Qiao and Wang, Unrestricted Warfare, p. xxi.
• Bunker, ‘Unrestricted Warfare: Review Essay II’; Van Messel, John, ‘Unrestricted Warfare: A Chinese Doctrine for Future Warfare?’, Master’s thesis, Marine Corps University, Quantico, 2005.
• Qiao and Wang, Unrestricted Warfare, p. 48.
• Lind, William, et al., ‘The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation’, Marine Corps Gazette (October 1989), pp. 22–6.
• Van Creveld, Martin, On Future War, London: Brasseys, 1991.
• Huntington, Samuel, The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order, London: Simon and Schuster, 1997.
• For example: Terriff, Terry, Aaron Karp and Regina Karp, (eds), Global Insurgency and the Future of Armed Conflict, New York: Routledge Press, 2007; Hammes, Thomas, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century, St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004; Benbow, Tim, ‘Talking ’Bout Our Generation? Assessing the Concept of “Fourth Generation Warfare”’, Comparative Strategy, 27, 2 (2008), pp. 148–63.
• Echevarria, Antulio, Fourth Generation War and Other Myths, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005.
• Lind, William, ‘Understanding Fourth Generation War’, Military Review (September–October 2004), p. 12.
• Echevarria, Fourth Generation War and Other Myths, p. v.
• Hammes, Sling and the Stone, p. 16.
• Rogers, Clifford (ed.), The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe, Oxford: Westview Press, 1995; Parker, Geoffrey, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988; Boot, Max, War Made New: Technology, Warfare and the Course of History, 1500 to Today, New York: Gotham Books, 2006; Murray, Williamson and Macgregor Knox (eds), The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300–2050, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
• Hammes, Sling and the Stone, pp. 17, 18.
• For example: Rogers, Military Revolution Debate; Parker, Military Revolution.
• Lind, ‘Understanding Fourth Generation War’, p. 12.
• Lind et al., ‘Changing Face of War’, p. 23; also see Hammes, Sling and the Stone, pp. 22–31.
• Lind, ‘Understanding Fourth Generation War’, p. 13.
• Hammes, Thomas, ‘War Evolves into the Fourth Generation’, Contemporary Security Policy, 26, 2 (2005), p. 197.
• Hammes, ‘War Evolves into the Fourth Generation’, p. 206.
• Echevarria, Fourth Generation War and Other Myths, p. 16.
• Huber, Thomas, ‘Napoleon in Spain and Naples: Fortified Compound Warfare’, in C610: The Evolution of Modern Warfare, Term I Syllabus/Book of Readings, Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1997.
• Huber, Thomas, ‘Compound Warfare: A Conceptual Framework’, in Huber, Compound Warfare, p. 1.
• Roberts, Michael, ‘The Military Revolution, 1560–1660’, in Rogers, Military Revolution Debate.
• See Morelock, Jerry, ‘Washington as Strategist: Compound Warfare in the American Revolution’ in Huber, Compound Warfare; Baumann, Robert, ‘Compound War Case Study: The Soviets in Afghanistan’, in Huber, Compound Warfare.
• Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century, pp. 25–6.
• Rumsfeld, Donald, ‘The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America’, Washington, DC, March 2005, p. v.

The Concept Of Compound Warfare.

Thomas Huber, a military historian, coined the term "compound warfare" in the late 1990s. 

In a  paper titled 'Napoleon in Spain and Naples: Fortified Compound Warfare,' Huber defined the term compound warfare for the first time. 

He reissued his work five years later in an edited anthology called Compound Warfare: That Fatal Knot, which included comments from a number of military historians who looked at various battles through the lens of his thesis. 

The military historians who invented the notion of compound warfare did not claim it was a novel phenomena, unlike the theories of unrestrained warfare and 4 GW, which were formed by practitioners (i.e. military or ex-military commanders). 

Compound warfare, on the other hand, is essentially a new conceptual framework that provides "a new method of handling difficult circumstances where regular and irregular troops have been utilized synergistically," and "the long history of conflict is filled" with such examples. 

Compound warfare, like other historians' conceptual frameworks based on historical precedents (such as Michael Roberts' notion of 'Military Revolution,' which was based on the example of Sweden in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries), is a basic concept with minimal theoretical framework: 

• The deployment of a regular or main army with an irregular or guerrilla force against an opponent is known as compound warfare. 

• The irregular force supplemented the regular military's efforts by providing intelligence, commodities, and personnel while denying them to the enemy.

• [and] The main force relieves the guerrilla force of the enemy's presence in the area, offers training and supplies, strategic knowledge, and political influence in the local area. 

• The total of the parts in compound warfare is more than the sum of the parts. 

In defining compound warfare, Huber emphasizes two key characteristics:

• Asymmetry and Occupation—'Compound warfare most typically happens when an intervening large power occupies all or part of a small power's territory.

• [and] after the bigger power's troops have been scattered over the weaker power's area, the lesser power may engage in compound warfare.'  

• While these two traits are necessary, Huber claims that compound warfare is a flexible phenomena, with a vast range of variation demonstrated via historical case studies. 

According to Huber, the notion of compound warfare posits that only one side (the lower power) may deploy compound warfare strategies against its larger adversary (occupier). 

• 'Both sides may employ compound warfare tactics... in most historical situations of compound warfare, one side utilizes compound warfare methods preferentially; the other side consciously uses them to the degree it is able,' says one expert. 

•  While Huber asserts that the compound warfare model assumes just two categories of force (regular and irregular), he also believes that "a variety of mobile regional militias may fall between these two poles and contribute significantly to the compound warfare operator's leverage."  

• On the one hand, the notion implies that the compound warfare operator (defined as "the overall commander in a compound warfare battle who successfully leads it") organizes all regular and irregular troops available to him. 

• 'In the more complicated reality, purposeful coordination may extend to all, some, one, or none of the military forces in play,' Huber says after examining multiple historical situations. 

Finally, although Huber's theoretical framework is binary, presuming that a fight is either compound warfare or not, he asserts that in practice, "one discovers degrees of compound warfare." 

There's compound warfare proper, which has all of the components of compound warfare in situ, and "quasi" compound warfare, which lacks one or more of the ingredients of compound warfare.'  

Huber, however, not only criticizes but also supports his own concept's simplicity. 

• According to him, the compound warfare model is intentionally uncomplicated in its most basic version to allow for the investigation of a wide range of difficult instances. 

• In other words, Huber aimed to create a notion that would serve as a lens through which to study the history of warfare, stating not only that it is replete with examples of regular and irregular troops fighting together, but also that compound warfare is a particularly successful kind of combat. 

• While the historical reality is complicated, "the basic Compound Warfare model, it is believed, would provide analysts a place to start in grappling with these intricacies," according to the report. 

'Fortified Compound Warfare,' according to Huber, is the most decisive and effective kind of compound warfare. 

A regular force will have access to a "safe haven" and will be partnered with a large power in fortified compound warfare, in addition to the two primary components of warfare (a regular force and an irregular force). 

The compound warfare operator's 'fortification' alludes to an abstract concept of 'protection from destruction' and' strengthening,' rather than the creation of real defensive positions: 

'The distinction between compound warfare, which is difficult to defeat, and fortified compound warfare, which is practically impossible to defeat, is made by fortification.'  

In other words, when a fortified compound warfare operator has a 'safe haven' for its main forces (providing the ability to withdraw the main regular force to a location inaccessible to the enemy due to geographic, technological, diplomatic, political, or other factors), as well as the support of a major ally, the fortified compound warfare operator 'can keep his regular force in being indefinitely [and] also protect and nourish the operator's guerrilla force in a location. 

Huber points to two great "quagmire" battles in which reinforced compound warfare was employed to defeat big-power opponents: 

• Spain from  1808 to 1814  
• and Vietnam from  1965 to 1973 . 

However, two additional conflicts fit within the definition of this term, according to the instances examined in his edited volume: 

• the American Revolution, which lasted from  1775 to 1783, 
• and the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, which lasted from  1979 to 1989 . 

Even though historians who studied these battles through the lens of compound warfare did not explicitly express it, it appears reasonable to claim that both events are examples of reinforced compound warfare. 

In the first, Vietnam's wide area provided a 'safe haven' for the US, while France acted as a major-power ally; in the second, Afghanistan's difficult mountain terrain provided refuge from the Soviets for Mujahedeen troops, while the US functioned as their primary partner. 

It's worth noting that Huber and other proponents of this theory haven't claimed that it's a brand-new phenomena. 

'

Because fortified compound warfare allows operators to fight and win, in almost every historical case, with conventional force ratios that would otherwise appear to be hopelessly inferior, it is likely to be encountered often in the future,' Huber said, observing and analyzing the history of warfare for similar patterns in which regular and irregular forces have been used simultaneously. 

As a result, 'military strategists must comprehend the mechanics of this sort of warfare prior to the occurrence.'

Lessons from the Ukraine Conflict on Hybrid Warfare vs. Compound Warfare. 

It was common soon after the commencement of open fighting in Ukraine to characterize the conflict as a kind of "hybrid warfare."

• The war's military and political dimensions, on the other hand, have grown well beyond the notion. 

• The Ukraine conflict has been more of a "compound" than a "hybrid" war; the tools and techniques used by the combatants are characteristic of the early post-Soviet period, with some new military-technical aspects and traditional Cold War-era fighting and strategies thrown in for good measure. 

• The battle has highlighted the need of land-based soldiers and munitions for European security once again. 

• It has also most likely set the tone for any future wars in the post-Soviet space. 

Hybrid Warfare: Is It a New Idea or Just a Slogan?

Valery Gerasimov, the Russian military's chief of general staff, laid out a framework for "hybrid warfare" in February 2013, more than a year before the conflict in Ukraine. 

• It included formally non-military measures (political, economic, and information/propaganda) as well as covert military action.

• His thesis was seen as a prototype for Russian behavior in Crimea and then in the Donbas as the crisis in Ukraine erupted. 

However, the notion of hybrid warfare was not invented by General Gerasimov, and it is not a Russian-only military concept. 

• In practically all armed conflicts, combat engagements mixing regular and irregular troops and components of "hybrid war" have been prevalent. 

• Private military firms, insurgency and counter-insurgency warfare, terrorism, as well as the intensive use of information warfare and operations aimed at destabilizing the enemy's economic and political system, are all examples of these aspects. 

• One of the key characteristics of hybrid warfare is the simultaneous use of conventional and irregular combat on the same operating area. 

Up until the summer of 2014, the Ukraine conflict was simply a "hybrid war" in its early stages. 

• Later, as the scope of hostilities grew, the fight devolved into an almost typical conventional operation reliant on large-scale armored and artillery deployments (albeit with relatively little use of airpower). 

• The conflict moved from a hybrid war to a "compound war" in August 2014, when Russian Army battalion tactical groups (BTG) openly battled with the Ukrainian army near Ilovaisk. 

• Compound warfare presupposes a "hybrid" of regular/irregular combat, civil conflict, and a regular army's unmasked engagement. 

• The 2014-2015 winter clashes for the Donetsk airport and Debaltsevo, for example, demonstrated the conflict's complexity. 

• Local pro-Russian irregular fighters, Russian "volunteers," regular Russian elite and special forces operating under the banners of the Luhansk and Donetsk People's Republics, and even some regular Russian heavy armor and motor-rifle BTGs fought against the Ukrainian army. 

Compound warfare, on the other hand, combines traditional and contemporary fighting strategies, including the employment of antiquated and cutting-edge weapons and equipment. 

• In this technical sense, the Ukraine conflict was also a compound war. 

• Heavy tanks and mechanized troops were backed by artillery and rocket systems, as well as unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), computerized command, control, communication, surveillance, and intelligence systems, and modern compact antitank and air defense missiles. 

Land Forces in a New Role: Lessons from the Battlefields of Ukraine.

The Ukraine war was Europe's first full-scale land conflicts since World War II, involving tens of thousands of tanks and motorized infantry units. 

• It also revealed the possibilities for a quick and high degree of military escalation in a European theater without the use of combat aircraft. 

• The transformation of the Ukraine conflict into "complex" but mostly ground warfare persuaded the US and NATO that conventional land troops continue to play a key role in modern European security architecture. 

• Only in the summer of 2013, American M-1 Abrams tanks were evacuated from Germany and returned to the continent the following spring. 

Small, symbolic US Army forces have been "temporarily" sent to Poland, Romania, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia, all of which are younger NATO members. 

• Since last spring, paratroopers from the US 173rd Airborne Brigade have been training alongside the military of these countries, and the Pentagon prepares to permanently send additional US ground soldiers to Europe. 

• In Georgia, the US has also been training Ukrainian soldiers and taking part in joint military exercises. 

• The newly formed NATO Very High Readiness Joint Task Force is tasked with preparing military ground units (VJTF). 

• The VJTF's formation, the 173rd airborne brigade's joint military exercises, the demonstrative march of the US 2nd Cavalry Regiment through Eastern Europe, and the prospects for permanent deployment of additional US troops in some newer NATO members all correspond to a key element of the Cold War-style deterrence system known as "trip-wires." 

"The rhetoric of deterrence, confinement, and economic isolation has returned from well-earned retirement," as Samuel Charap and Jeremy Shapiro put it. 

• In this scenario, even "symbolic" NATO or US ground forces deployed forward in Eastern Europe might serve a similar function to Allied soldiers in Berlin during the Cold War. 

Russia, on the other hand, has embraced the increased importance of ground troops the most. 

• Land forces have played a vital part in the formation of the Russian military since imperial and Soviet times, and they have been the most compelling aspect of Russian military and geopolitical power projection in its area. 

• The T-14 Armata tank, the T-15 and Kurganets armored vehicles, and the Koalitsiya self-propelled howitzer were among the land-based vehicles and armaments on show during Russia's Victory Day parade in May 2015. 

President Vladimir Putin promised to enhance Russia's rearmament of its land troops during a meeting with Russia's military leadership and business executives later that month. 

This will come at the price of Russia's naval budget, however the government will keep the faster rehabilitation of the Black Sea Fleet and the upgrading of Russia's nuclear triad's sea-based leg as top priority. 

• The rapid development of three new tank and motor rifle divisions, the 2nd Guards Tamanskaya Motor Rifle, 4th Guards Kantemirovskaya Tank, and the 10th Guards Tank divisions, is another evidence of Russia's rising relevance for ground forces. 

• The first two are Russia's first new tank units since the Cold War ended, and they will serve as the foundation for a new 1st Guards Tank Army. 

• The 10th Guards division, which is currently being formed, will be stationed at Boguchar, near the Ukrainian border, in the Voronezh area. 

• The 10th Guards will be linked to the 20th Guards Combined Army, a new force. 

• The 1st Guards Tank Army and the 20th Guards Combined Army are both part of Russia's Western Military District, and its operational focus is mostly on Ukraine. 

• They will be the first troops to get newly designed armor systems such as the Armata and Kurganets in 2016-2017. 

• The necessity of professional, light, and mobile special-purpose ground troops was also shown during the Ukraine war. 

• Small arms and light weapons gained in strength, accuracy, and range, allowing small forces to perform combat missions that would previously have been allocated to bigger military groups. 

• Elite forces from Russia's newly founded Command of Special Operations Forces, as well as Russian GRU spetsnaz, Airborne Forces (VDV), and Marines, played a critical part in Russia's activities in Crimea and the Donbas. 

Post-Soviet Conflicts in the 21st Century: Compound Wars 

The military lessons learned in the Ukraine war might be applied to other post-Soviet conflicts, particularly in the Caucasus. 

• Given today's powerful air defense systems, combat aircraft may not be able to play a crucial role. 

• The crisis in Ukraine has also indicated that unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) may play a larger role, albeit they will mostly serve as a support, intelligence, and surveillance tool rather than a stand-alone piece of military hardware. 

Finally, despite the widespread deployment of large-caliber multiple-launch rocket systems (Smerch, Uragan) and tactical missiles (Tochka-U) by both sides, they did not prove to be decisive. 

This is an eye-opening statistic in the context of the Nagorno-Karabakh war. 

• In the event of large-scale military confrontations, the Azerbaijani leadership has preserved the option of utilizing large-caliber multiple-launch rocket systems and tactical missiles in reserve. 

The Donbas wars, on the other hand, revealed that these long-range weaponry are not "wonder weapons" capable of achieving a swift and painless victory. 

For the time being, the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh is more akin to a "low intensity struggle" than a "hybrid war." Along the line of contact, permanent border conflicts and sniper warfare continue. 

The situation might, however, alter. 

The involvement of regular Russian army personnel without their own insignia was one of the emblems of "hybrid war" in Ukraine (or wearing those of the DNR or LNR). 

In the case of a full-scale battle, a scenario similar to this may develop. 

In the 1990s, Turkish "volunteers" took part in military engagements in Nagorno-Karabakh, and a small Turkish Army unit has purportedly been stationed in the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan for some time to undertake training and intelligence tasks. 

Under an effort to launch a blitzkrieg on Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkish special commandos in Azerbaijani insignia may join large-scale Azerbaijani military groups with their own heavy vehicles and artillery. 

Georgia has turned its attention to hybrid warfare as a result of the lessons learned from its 2008 war with Russia and the Ukraine crisis. 

However, it's unclear if the lessons acquired from the Ukrainian crisis are completely applicable to the Georgian situation. 

Nonetheless, the Georgian military's heavy armor and mechanized infantry formations, as well as combat aviation, have all been considerably reduced. 

• It has boosted expenditure on air defenses, light infantry, special operations forces, and helicopter units (including the acquisition of advanced air defense and radar equipment from France in the summer of 2015). 

• Georgia is training its military for hybrid/irregular types of battle with this new style of territorial defense. 

• Georgia's military leadership has also established specific defensive zones around the nation, each with a regular Army Infantry Battle Group and three to four Territorial Army Regiments staffed by reservists. 

However, it is unclear if such "hybrid" preparations would improve Georgia's defensive capability, given any future battle with Russia is likely to employ mostly traditional combat techniques. 

• During the August 2008 clashes on Georgian soil, the Russian military used few irregular or hybrid techniques. 

• Their tactics were more like to a traditional invasion, with conventional ground soldiers, armor, and artillery backed up by the air force and the Black Sea fleet. 

In the end, the Ukraine war was shown to be just the most recent traditional armed conflict in the post-Soviet realm, with some hybrid and irregular components thrown in for good measure. 

Future post-Soviet confrontations are anticipated to be "compound," combining large-scale tank combat with more hybrid techniques, such as heavy use of electronic, information, and economic warfare.

~ Jai Krishna Ponnappan

You may also want to read and learn more about Global Geo Politics, Conflicts, And Conflict Resolution here.

Attached: Read the book, ' Compound Warfare: That Fatal Knot' by Thomas M. Huber.

Sources, References & Further Reading:

• Hoffman, Frank, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Warfare, Arlington: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007, p. 14.
• For example: Nemeth, William, ‘Future War and Chechnya: A Case for Hybrid Warfare’, PhD diss., Monterey, Naval Postgraduate School, 2002; Morelock, Jerry, ‘Washington as Strategist: Compound Warfare in the American Revolution, 1775–1783’, in Huber, Thomas (ed.), Compound Warfare: That Fatal Knot, Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2002, p. 78.
• Qiao, Liang and Xiangsui Wang, Unrestricted Warfare: China’s Master Plan to Destroy America, Panama City: Pan American Publishing Company, 2002.
• Scobell, Andrew, ‘Introduction to Review Essays on “Unrestricted Warfare”’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 11, 1 (Spring 2000), pp. 112–13; Cheng, Dean, ‘Unrestricted Warfare: Review Essay II’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 11, 1 (Spring 2000), pp. 122–9.
• Thomas Moorer cited on the back cover of Qiao and Wang, Unrestricted Warfare.
• Bunker, Robert, ‘Unrestricted Warfare: Review Essay II’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 11, 1 (Spring 2000), pp. 114.
• Luman, Ronald (ed.), Unrestricted Warfare Symposium 2006: Proceedings on Strategy, Analysis, and Technology, Laurel, MD: Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, 2006; Luman, (ed.), Unrestricted Warfare Symposium 2008: Proceedings on Combating the Unrestricted Warfare Threat; Integrating Strategy, Analysis, and Technology, Laurel, MD: Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, 2008.
• Qiao and Wang, Unrestricted Warfare, p. 155.
• Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century, p. 22.
• Qiao and Wang, Unrestricted Warfare, p. xxi.
• Bunker, ‘Unrestricted Warfare: Review Essay II’; Van Messel, John, ‘Unrestricted Warfare: A Chinese Doctrine for Future Warfare?’, Master’s thesis, Marine Corps University, Quantico, 2005.
• Qiao and Wang, Unrestricted Warfare, p. 48.
• Lind, William, et al., ‘The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation’, Marine Corps Gazette (October 1989), pp. 22–6.
• Van Creveld, Martin, On Future War, London: Brasseys, 1991.
• Huntington, Samuel, The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order, London: Simon and Schuster, 1997.
• For example: Terriff, Terry, Aaron Karp and Regina Karp, (eds), Global Insurgency and the Future of Armed Conflict, New York: Routledge Press, 2007; Hammes, Thomas, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century, St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004; Benbow, Tim, ‘Talking ’Bout Our Generation? Assessing the Concept of “Fourth Generation Warfare”’, Comparative Strategy, 27, 2 (2008), pp. 148–63.
• Echevarria, Antulio, Fourth Generation War and Other Myths, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005.
• Lind, William, ‘Understanding Fourth Generation War’, Military Review (September–October 2004), p. 12.
• Echevarria, Fourth Generation War and Other Myths, p. v.
• Hammes, Sling and the Stone, p. 16.
• Rogers, Clifford (ed.), The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe, Oxford: Westview Press, 1995; Parker, Geoffrey, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988; Boot, Max, War Made New: Technology, Warfare and the Course of History, 1500 to Today, New York: Gotham Books, 2006; Murray, Williamson and Macgregor Knox (eds), The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300–2050, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
• Hammes, Sling and the Stone, pp. 17, 18.
• For example: Rogers, Military Revolution Debate; Parker, Military Revolution.
• Lind, ‘Understanding Fourth Generation War’, p. 12.
• Lind et al., ‘Changing Face of War’, p. 23; also see Hammes, Sling and the Stone, pp. 22–31.
• Lind, ‘Understanding Fourth Generation War’, p. 13.
• Hammes, Thomas, ‘War Evolves into the Fourth Generation’, Contemporary Security Policy, 26, 2 (2005), p. 197.
• Hammes, ‘War Evolves into the Fourth Generation’, p. 206.
• Echevarria, Fourth Generation War and Other Myths, p. 16.
• Huber, Thomas, ‘Napoleon in Spain and Naples: Fortified Compound Warfare’, in C610: The Evolution of Modern Warfare, Term I Syllabus/Book of Readings, Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1997.
• Huber, Thomas, ‘Compound Warfare: A Conceptual Framework’, in Huber, Compound Warfare, p. 1.
• Roberts, Michael, ‘The Military Revolution, 1560–1660’, in Rogers, Military Revolution Debate.
• See Morelock, Jerry, ‘Washington as Strategist: Compound Warfare in the American Revolution’ in Huber, Compound Warfare; Baumann, Robert, ‘Compound War Case Study: The Soviets in Afghanistan’, in Huber, Compound Warfare.
• Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century, pp. 25–6.
• Rumsfeld, Donald, ‘The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America’, Washington, DC, March 2005, p. v.